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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California had 
jurisdiction over Plaintiff Webeceleb, Inc.’s (“Webceleb”) claims pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§1331 and 1338. 
 This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291 
because the appeal is from a final judgment. 
 This appeal was timely filed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §2107(a) and 
Rule 4(a), Fed. R. App. P., in that the judgment of the district court was entered on 
September 25, 2012, and the Notice of Appeal was filed with the district court on 
October 23, 2012. 
 This appeal is taken from the Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the Judgment in a Civil Case entered September 25, 2012. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES  
TO BE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Whether the district court erred as a matter of law in applying the artistic 
relevance test to Defendants’ commercial use of the WEBCELEB mark. 
B. Whether the district court erred in granting Defendants motion for summary 
judgment based on the Rogers artistic relevance test. 
C. Whether the district court erred in denying Plaintiff’s motion for further 
discovery pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). 
 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 On November 9, 2010, Webceleb filed a complaint initiating this action 
against Defendant Procter & Gamble, claiming trademark infringement pursuant to 
15 U.S.C. §§1114 and 1125, and unfair competition under California Business & 
Professions Code §17200, and seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief 
and damages based on P&G’s infringing use of its federally registered 
WEBCELEB mark in connection with an award category for P&G’s People’s 
Choice Awards.   ER415.  On November 19, 2010, Webceleb filed a motion for 
preliminary injunction seeking an order enjoining P&G from any further use of the 
WEBCELEB mark in connection with the People’s Choice Awards or any other 
P&G product or production.  Id. 
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 Just prior to filing its opposition to Webceleb’s motion for preliminary 
injunction on December 3, 2010, P&G voluntarily stopped its infringing use of the 
WEBCELEB mark.  Finding that the “substantive relief sought therein has been 
voluntarily undertaken by Defendant The Procter & Gamble Company,” on 
December 13, 2010, the district court denied Webceleb’s preliminary injunction 
motion as moot, without prejudice to a future motion for injunctive relief if P&G 
took action inconsistent with its representations that it would no longer use the 
WEBCELEB mark.  ER411-412. 
 On September 29, 2011, Webceleb and P&G filed a Joint Motion for Leave 
to File First Amended Complaint.  ER417.  On October 7, 2011, the district court 
granted this motion, and on October 11, 2011, Webceleb filed its First Amended 
Complaint asserting the same claims as the original complaint, but adding 
BermanBraun LLC and Microsoft Corporation as Defendants based on their use of 
the WEBCELEB mark in connection with their WonderWall celebrity gossip 
website.  ER403-410.  On December 16, 2011, BermanBraun and Microsoft 
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing, failure to state a claim, and 
defenses based on First Amendment protections and a classic fair use.  ER418.  On 
February 13, 2012, the district court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss.  Id. 
 On May 14, 2012, the district court issued a Case Management Conference 
Order Regulating Discovery and Other Pretrial Proceedings (the “Scheduling 
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Order”) setting a schedule for the case through trial.  ER419.  Pursuant to the 
Scheduling Order, discovery was set to close on October 29, 2012. 
 On June 12, 2012, Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment 
based primarily on their First Amendment and fair use defenses.  Id.  On July 27, 
2012, Webceleb filed its opposition, and on August 3, 2012, Defendants filed their 
reply.  ER420.  On August 6, 2012, the district court cancelled oral argument.  
ER421.  On September 25, the district court entered an order granting Defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment and the clerk entered judgment for Defendants.  
ER6-15. 
II.  STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Webceleb is an online independent music distribution platform and social 
network dedicated to the discovery and promotion of independent musicians.  
Through its web site at www.webceleb.com, Webceleb connects independent 
musicians with fans looking for new music that is not being promoted by the major 
commercial record labels and mainstream radio stations.  Since early 2007, 
Webceleb devoted all of its limited resources to developing and marketing an 
innovative, internet-driven business model that lets music fans play a direct role in 
the success of independent musicians. 
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A. Webceleb’s History and Development 
The concept for Webceleb was developed in early 2007 by Alexander Rolek, 
Justen Palmer and Scott Fetters.  ER 38.  Webceleb was originally conceived as a 
social website on which a wide variety of independent artists — musicians, 
comedians, performance artists, models, photographers and others — could 
showcase their talents.  Id. 
Webceleb.com evolved from this original concept, but consistently focused 
on developing a strong brand identity devoted to promoting undiscovered 
independent artists.  ER38-39.  This core value is the basis for Webceleb’s tag line 
– “Discover.  Be Discovered.”  It is also at the very heart of Webceleb’s business 
model, which has three key elements: (1) attract independent artists to post their 
work on Webceleb; (2) market those artists by leveraging existing social 
networking and quick information sharing websites such as Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube through the concept of “crowd sourcing”; and (3) monetize Webceleb by 
selling the artists’ work through a unique profit sharing model in which the artist 
receives the majority of the revenues, Webceleb receives a small percentage, and 
the fans that buy the artist’s work actually receive a significant share of the 
revenues generated by subsequent sales (this is referred to as the “Slice” revenue 
model).  ER38-42. 
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B. Marketing and Brand Development 
Webceleb’s entire business model relies on its brand identity.  Webceleb 
does all of its business using the WEBCELEB mark and www.webceleb.com 
domain.  Webceleb is the owner of U.S. Trademark Registration No. 3756711 for 
the mark WEBCELEB in international class 042 for an internet based media 
sharing platform, described more specifically in the registration as “Providing 
temporary use of on-line non-downloadable software to enable uploading, posting, 
showing, displaying, tagging, blogging, sharing, or otherwise providing electronic 
media or information in the field of general interest over the Internet or other 
communications network.”  ER37-38. 
Webceleb’s crowd sourcing business model channels and relies on the 
power of social media sites like Facebook, YouTube, and quick information 
sharers like Twitter.  These sites are vital to the survival of Webceleb, which 
leverages them to develop the Webceleb brand and promote the music and other 
media hosted on Webceleb as these platforms can quickly drive huge amounts of 
traffic to a particular song or artist.  ER38-39.  Facebook and Twitter sharing in 
particular have been incredibly effective forms of marketing for Webceleb.1   
Webceleb also has marketed and promoted its web site through various live 
music events and online competitions all directed to the independent music 
                                                
1 Twitter is an important communication tool that is based on the broadcast of brief 
messages called “tweets” to very large numbers of people. 
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community.  Since August of 2007, Webceleb has sponsored independent music 
events at a range of venues and locations.  ER42-43.  Collectively these efforts 
have developed a strong association between the WEBCELEB trademark and the 
discovery and promotion of independent music.  ER43-45. 
C. People’s Choice Awards Web Celeb Category 
P&G is the owner of the annual People’s Choice Awards, which typically 
airs each year on national television in early January.  Unknown to Webceleb, the 
People’s Choice Awards initiated a new award category for its January 2010 show 
called “Web Celeb.”  ER45.  On January 6, 2010, when the People’s Choice 
Awards show aired the results of the Web Celeb category for the first time, 
Webceleb experienced an unprecedented increase in the number of visitors to its 
web site.  While Webceleb saw this spike in visits when it occurred, the company 
did not understand that it was related to the People’s Choice Awards and only later 
learned that P&G had created a Web Celeb category.  Id. 
During subsequent months there was no activity in connection with the 
People’s Choice Awards and thus no detectable impact on Webceleb.  However, 
when P&G began its promotional campaign for the 2011 Awards show in mid-
October of 2010, Webceleb saw a notable falling off of traffic to the Webceleb 
website.  ER46.  At the same time, Webceleb detected an unexpected increase in 
traffic across the Twitter platform relating to the keyword “webceleb.”  This 
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increased traffic was directly linked to People’s Choice Web Celeb voting as P&G 
was using a Twitter device called a “hashtag” to insert the term “webceleb” as a 
keyword in automatically generated messages – called tweets on Twitter – that 
were broadcast with every vote that that is shared on Twitter.  ER47-48. 
Historically, Webceleb’s own tweets have always had a significant presence 
in Twitter search results for “webceleb.”  ER48.  As a result of P&G’s Twitter 
campaign using the keyword “webceleb,” every Twitter search for the term 
“webceleb” was now dominated by scripted “tweets” automatically generated by 
people voting for People’s Choice “Web Celebs.”  Targeted and linked rich tweets 
from Webceleb’s Twitter account were buried beneath the People’s Choice voting 
tweets.  Id.  The People’s Choice Twitter campaign effectively drove Webceleb off 
the Twitter field of interest, and destroyed Twitter as a platform for promoting 
Webceleb.  Id.  
Defendants’ Microsoft and BermanBraun are partners in a celebrity gossip 
website called WonderWall.  ER50-54.  The WonderWall web site was the official 
sponsor of the People’s Choice Web Celeb award category and promoted the Web 
Celeb category heavily on its web site at www.wonderwall.com.  The WonderWall 
web site included an entire section devoted to Web Celeb nominees, with 
individual pages for each nominee.  Each individual page included Facebook and 
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Twitter sharing buttons to allow users to easily share their interest in a particular 
WonderWall page and drive traffic to the WonderWall site.  Id.  
Microsoft and BermanBraun viewed their WonderWall Web Celeb section 
as a brand franchise, and actively worked to develop and promote it using the 
WEBCELEB mark.  ER53.  Thus, P&G used WonderWall’s sponsorship to 
develop and promote the Web Celeb category of its People’s Choice Awards, 
while Microsoft and BermanBraun used the Web Celeb category to develop and 
promote its own Web Celeb branded celebrity gossip pages devoted to the latest 
news on the Kardashians and other media celebrities. 
 
III.  SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 The district court erred as a matter of law when it applied the Rogers artistic 
relevance test to evaluate Defendants’ commercial use of the WEBCELEB mark in 
connection with the People’s Choice Awards show and the WonderWall celebrity 
gossip site.  The Rogers test strikes an appropriate balance between First 
Amendment protections and the public’s interest in avoiding confusion in cases 
involving artistic use of culturally significant marks.  Extension of the Rogers test 
to cases involving non-artistic, commercial use of marks that are not culturally 
significant, however, takes the test far beyond its legal underpinnings.  This case 
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involves commercial, infringing uses of Webceleb’s mark that does not implicate 
the First Amendment concerns that the Rogers test evolved to address. 
 Even if applied here, Defendants’ use of the WEBCELEB mark was purely 
commercial use that is not artistically relevant to any underlying work.  Artistic 
relevance requires an artistic use of the mark, not just any relevance to the 
underlying subject matter.  Here, it is at least a genuine issue of fact whether or not 
Defendants’ use of the WEBCELEB mark is not artistically relevant and explicitly 
misleading.     
 The district court also erred in denying Webceleb’s Rule 56(d) request that it 
deny or defer the motion for summary judgment to allow for further discovery.  
Webceleb diligently pursued discovery and identified specific discovery relevant to 
genuine issues of material fact that needed to be obtained in order to respond to 
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.   
 
IV.  ARGUMENT 
 This Court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. 
Szajer v. City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 2011); Universal Health 
Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004).  “[R]eview is 
governed by the same standard used by the trial court under Federal Civil Rule 
56(c).”  Adcock v. Chrysler Corp., 166 F.3d 1290, 1292 (9th Cir. 1999).  This 
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Court “must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and 
whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.”  
Universal Health Servs., 363 F.3d at 1019 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
When the underlying facts are not in dispute, the court's only function is to 
determine whether the district court correctly applied the law.  Id.  
 “Summary judgment is appropriate only if, taking the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, there are genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Corales v. Bennett, Inc., 567 F.3d 554, 
562 (9th Cir. 2009).  “A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the 
litigation and requires a trial to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth.”  
S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1982). 
The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary 
judgment is proper.  Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).  The 
moving party must identify the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, or other evidence 
that it “believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”  
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  If the moving party satisfies 
this initial burden, then the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that 
summary judgment is not appropriate.  Id. at 324.  The opposing party’s evidence 
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is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor.  
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).  However, to avoid 
summary judgment, the opposing party cannot rest solely on conclusory allegations 
but must designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.  Berg v. 
Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986).   
Due to the “intensely factual nature of trademark disputes,” pre-trial 
dispositive motions are generally disfavored for trademark cases in the Ninth 
Circuit.  Intersteller Starship Services, Ltd. v. Epix Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (citing Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1356 n.5 
(9th Cir. 1985)); see also Bell v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 539 F. Supp. 2d 
1249, 1255 (S.D. Cal. 2008). 
A. The District Court Erred As a Matter of Law in Applying the Rogers 
Artistic Relevance Test  
 
 The district court erred as a matter of law in its application of the artistic 
relevance test to this case.  The artistic relevance test is sometimes referred to as 
the Rogers test in reference to the case Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 
1989), which developed the test in connection with an infringement claim 
involving the title of a movie.  Careful consideration of the development and legal 
rationale fro the Rogers test establish that it should not have been applied in this 
case. 
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 1. The Original Context for the Rogers Artistic Relevance Test 
In Rogers, the iconic actress Ginger Rogers filed a Lanham Act claim to 
prevent the use of the phrase “Ginger and Fred” as the title of a Fellini movie about 
two fictional Italian dancers that imitated Ms. Rogers and Fred Astaire.  Id. at 996.  
Ms. Rogers claimed that the use of her name in the title of the movie created the 
false impression that she sponsored, endorsed, or was otherwise involved in the 
film.  The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, finding that 
the use of Ms. Rogers’ name in the title of the movie was an exercise of artistic 
expression rather than commercial speech.  The district court then held that 
“because the speech at issue here is not primarily intended to serve a commercial 
purpose, the prohibitions of the Lanham Act do not apply, and the Film is entitled 
to the full scope of protection under the First Amendment.”  Id. at 997.   
According to the district court in the Rogers case, the Lanham Act “cannot 
apply to the title of a motion picture where the title is ‘within the realm of artistic 
expression,’ and is not ‘primarily intended to serve a commercial purpose.’”  Id. at 
997 (citations omitted).  The district court concluded that the use of the title 
“Ginger and Fred” did not violate the Lanham Act “because of the undisputed 
artistic relevance of the title to the content of the film.  Id. 
On review, the Second Circuit recognized that the district court’s holding 
“would create a nearly absolute privilege for movie titles, insulating them from 
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Lanham Act claims as long as the film itself is an artistic work, and the title is 
relevant to the film’s content.”  Id.  The Court of Appeal sought instead to balance 
the protection afforded to such titles against the reality that even truly artistic 
works are subject to trademark restrictions:   
Movies, plays, books, and songs are all indisputably works of artistic 
expression and deserve protection.  Nonetheless, they are also sold in 
the commercial marketplace like other more utilitarian products, 
making the danger of consumer deception a legitimate concern that 
warrants some government regulation.  Poetic license is not without 
limits. The purchaser of a book, like the purchaser of a can of peas, 
has a right not to be misled as to the source of the product. 
 
Id. at 997 (citations omitted).  “Though First Amendment concerns do not insulate 
titles of artistic works from all Lanham Act claims, such concerns must 
nonetheless inform our consideration of the scope of the Act as applied to claims 
involving such titles.”  Id. at 998. 
 Discussing the “hybrid nature” of titles of artistic works, the court 
recognized that the title of a movie “may be both an integral element of the film-
maker’s expression as well as a significant means of marketing the film to the 
public.”  Id.  Writers and filmmakers “frequently rely on word-play, ambiguity, 
irony, and allusion in titling their works.”  At the same time, consumers have a 
dual interest in “not being misled and enjoying the results of the author’s freedom 
of expression.”  “For all of these reasons, the expressive element of titles requires 
more protection than the labeling of ordinary commercial products.”  Id.  From 
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this, the Second Circuit concluded that because “overextension of Lanham Act 
restrictions in the area of titles might intrude on First Amendment values, we must 
construe the Act narrowly to avoid such a conflict.”  Id. 
In attempting to craft a test that would appropriately balance these 
competing interests, the Second Circuit expressly recognized that “the Act should 
be construed to apply to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding 
consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression.”  Id. at 999.  
The court concluded that: 
In the context of allegedly misleading titles using a celebrity’s name, 
that balance will normally not support application of the Act unless 
the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, 
or if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads 
as to the source or the content of the work.  
 
Id.  In its subsequent explanation, the court makes it clear that this test is extremely 
specific to the context of a title of an artistic work that uses a celebrity’s name, and 
warns that the justifications for striking the balance in this way may break down in 
the closely related context of “misleading titles that are confusingly similar to other 
titles.”  Id. at n.5.  Even in such a similar situation, “the public interest in sparing 
consumers this type of confusion outweighs the slight public interest in permitting 
authors to use such titles.”  Id. 
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 2. Ninth Circuit Application of the Rogers Test 
In Mattel v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), this Court 
bravely took on a similar battle between “Speech-Zilla” and “Trademark Kong.”  
Id. at 898.  Mattel had sued MCA Records for trademark infringement under the 
Lanham Act based on its production, marketing, and sale of the song Barbie Girl 
by the Danish band Aqua.  The district court held that the song Barbie Girl is a 
parody of Barbie and a nominative fair use that was not likely to confuse 
consumers.  Id. 
On appeal, this Court recognized that in ordinary circumstances there is no 
conflict between the source-identifying function of trademarks and First 
Amendment rights.  By way of example, the Court noted that “[w]hatever first 
amendment rights you may have in calling the brew you make in your bathtub 
‘Pepsi’ are easily outweighed by the buyer's interest in not being fooled into 
buying it.”  Id. at 900, quoting Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 960, 973 
(1993). 
The problem arises, however, when marks “transcend their identifying 
purpose” and “enter public discourse and become an integral part of our 
vocabulary,” because they assume a role “outside the bounds of trademark law.” 
Id. at 900.  Where a mark assumes such cultural significance, First Amendment 
protections come into play, and “the trademark owner does not have the right to 
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control public discourse whenever the public imbues his mark with a meaning 
beyond its source-identifying function.”  Id.  See also New Kids on the Block v. 
News Am. Publ’g Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1992).  Thus, when an artistic 
work targets the original and does not merely borrow another’s property to get 
attention, First Amendment interests weigh more heavily in the balance.  Id. 
(distinguishing Dr. Seuss Ents., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 
1400 (9th Cir. 1997). 
The Court then discussed Rogers, noting that if a “pair of dancing shoes” 
had been labeled “Ginger and Fred,” a dancer might have suspected that Rogers 
was associated with the shoes.  Id. at 901-902.  But where the name “Ginger and 
Fred” was the title of a movie, it was being used artistically and must be treated 
differently.  Id. at 902.   The Court then adopted the Rogers balancing test in the 
specific context of “literary titles,” and affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of defendants. 
This Court applied the Rogers artistic relevance test again in Mattel Inc. v. 
Walking Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003), another Barbie case 
involving another artistic work.  In Walking Mountain, Mattel sued a photographer 
who produced and sold photographs of a nude Barbie doll in danger of being 
attacked by vintage household appliances.  Id. at 796.  Mattel sued for 
infringement of its Barbie trademark based on its use in the titles of the 
Case: 12-56943     01/31/2013          ID: 8496566     DktEntry: 6-1     Page: 24 of 42 (24 of 43)
  18 
photographs.  Id.  The district court granted defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment on the trademark claims, finding no likelihood of confusion as to 
Mattel’s sponsorship of the allegedly infringing works.   
Citing MCA Records, this Court again noted that when marks “transcend 
their identifying purpose” and “enter public discourse and become an integral part 
of our vocabulary” they assume a role outside the bounds of trademark law.  As 
such, when a “mark assumes such cultural significance, First Amendment 
protections come into play.”  Id. at 807.  Adopting the holding of MCA Records, 
the Court applied the Rogers artistic relevance test and found that the use of the 
Barbie mark in the titles of the photographs was artistically relevant since Barbie 
was the subject of the artistic expression parodying Barbie and the values she was 
claimed to represent.  Accordingly, the public interest in free artistic expression 
“greatly outweighs its interest in potential consumer confusion about Mattel’s 
sponsorship of [defendant’s] works.”  Id.  
In Walking Mountain, the Court chose not to apply the Rogers artistic 
relevance test to Mattel’s trade dress claims, noting that trade dress claims or 
trademark claims involving uses other than in the title of an artistic work may be 
“incompatible with the Rogers test.”  Id. at 808, n.14.  Thus, consistent with both 
the Rogers case and MCA Records, Walking Mountain again narrowly limited its 
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application of the Rogers artistic relevance test to a situation where a culturally 
significant mark was used in an artistically meaningful way in the title of the work.   
This Court subsequently applied the Rogers artistic relevance test outside of 
this narrow context in E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 
547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008).  Plaintiff E.S.S Entertainment operates a strip club 
in eastern Los Angeles using the “Play Pen” mark.  Rock Star sells a video game 
that takes place in a fictional city called Los Santos that is modeled on Los 
Angeles, and which includes a depiction of an East Los Santos strip club called the 
“Pig Pen” that generally resembles the Play Pen.  E.S.S. Entertainment sued Rock 
Star on claims including trade dress infringement and unfair competition under the 
Lanham Act.  The district court granted Rock Star’s motion for summary judgment 
based on a First Amendment defense. 
None of the parties in E.S.S. Entertainment objected to application of the 
Rogers test, and this Court found “no principled reason” not to apply the Rogers 
artistic relevance test to the use of a trademark in the body of a work rather in the 
title.  Applying the test, the Court first found that the inclusion of a strip club 
similar in look and feel to the Play Pen had “some artistic relevance” to the video 
game.  The Court next found no indication that the “buying public would 
reasonably have believed that ESS produced the video game or, for that matter, 
that Rockstar operated a strip club.”  Id. at 1100. 
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          3. The Rogers Test Does Not Apply to Defendants’ Use of the 
WEBCELEB Mark  
 
The MCA Records and Walking Mountain cases applied the Rogers test in 
the correct context of cases like Rogers itself that involved iconic marks being used 
in the titles of highly artistic works.  Application of the Rogers artistic relevance 
test outside of that context pulls it from its moorings, transforming it into exactly 
what the Second Circuit sought to prevent – a “nearly absolute privilege” against 
valid Lanham Act claims. 
The justification for First Amendment protection invoked in Rogers, MCA 
Records, and Walking Mountain is simply not present here.  The common thread in 
those cases is a senior user of a culturally significant mark seeking to prevent the 
use of its trademark in the title of an expressive work authored by a junior user 
who intends an association with the senior user.  Masters Software, Inc. v. 
Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 725 F.Supp. 2d 1294, 1306 (W.D. Wash. 2010).   In 
that specific context, the Rogers artistic relevance test properly balances the strong 
First Amendment interests of such a use of a culturally significant mark as part of 
an artistic expression, against the limited risk of consumer confusion in most such 
uses.   
Here, however, the district court has applied the test in an entirely different 
context, where the defendant has used a mark that is not culturally significant in a 
commercial rather than artistic context.  Defendants did not use the WEBCELEB 
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mark as an artistically expressive communication.  Their uses make no allusion to 
Plaintiff Webceleb or its products and services.  Rather, P&G used it as a label for 
a category used in a commercial television award show, while Microsoft and 
BermanBraun used it as a brand identifier for particular pages on their 
WonderWall celebrity gossip website.  In both circumstances, the Defendants 
were: 
expressing nothing more than what any user of a suggestive trademark 
expresses when branding its product, and the Lanham Act's limitations on 
such “expressions” do not violate the First Amendment. See, e.g., Mattel, 
296 F.3d at 900 (noting that when “limited to [their] core purpose – avoiding 
confusion in the marketplace – a trademark owner's property rights play well 
with the First Amendment”). 
 
Masters Software, Inc., 725 F.Supp. 2d at 1306; see also Dita, Inc. v. Mendez, No. 
CV 10–6277 PSG (FMOx), 2010 WL 5140855 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2010) 
(examining the required association between the junior and senior work required 
for First Amendment protection). 
Notwithstanding the unopposed application of the Rogers test to use of a 
non-culturally significant mark in the body of a video game in E.S.S. 
Entertainment, several courts have properly limited application of the Rogers test 
to claims involving a mark that is “of such cultural significance that it has become 
an integral part of the public’s vocabulary.”  See Rebelution, LLC v. Perez, 732 
F.Supp. 2d 883, 887 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Masters Software, Inc. v. Discovery 
Commc’ns, Inc., 725 F.Supp. 2d 1294, 1306 (W.D. Wash. 2010); Dita, Inc. v. 
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Mendez, No. CV 10–6277 PSG (FMOx), 2010 WL 5140855 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 
2010).  This cultural significance requirement reflects the underlying basis for the 
balancing test as set forth in Rogers and in the MCA Records case, which 
emphasized that when a mark “has taken on an expressive meaning apart from its 
source-identifying function,” application of the traditional likelihood of confusion 
test fails to account for the full weight of the public’s interest in free expression.  
MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 900.   
This understanding was reinforced in Walking Mountain, where the court 
indicated that First Amendment protections “come into play” when a mark 
transcends its source identifying purpose and enters the public discourse as part of 
our vocabulary.  Walking Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d at 807.  The Ninth Circuit’s 
examples of culturally significant trademarks are illuminating.  Rolls Royce, Band-
Aid, and Aspirin have all acquired transcendent meaning separate and distinct from 
their source identifying function as a trademark.   See MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 
900.    
Here, the district court erred when it applied the Rogers artistic relevance 
test.  The WEBCELEB mark has not transcended its source identifying purpose or 
obtained cultural significance, and was used by Defendants as a branding device 
not as an artistic reference to Webceleb’s service.  This case is fundamentally 
different than the use in the title “Ginger and Fred,” which uses Ms. Rogers’ name 
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to evoke a connection with Ms. Rogers herself as a key aspect of the artistic 
expression of the movie.  It is fundamentally different than the use of the iconic 
Barbie trademark in the title of the song or a photograph in which Barbie is the 
focus of the artistic expression itself.  Such cases demand broad First Amendment 
protection, as the mark itself and its cultural relevance are central to the artistic 
expression.  
  P&G’s use of the WEBCELEB mark as the name of an award category in a 
commercial production like the People’s Choice Awards had no artistic 
significance.  Microsoft and BermanBrauns use of the WEBCELEB mark to brand 
parts of their WonderWall gossip website had no artistic significance.  Neither use 
was an artistic reference to Plaintiff Webceleb or its product.  Neither use was an 
ironic use of a culturally significant name or mark.   
 Rather, both were classic commercial branding uses, as Defendants tried to 
create a WEBCELEB franchise that they could commercialize across their internet 
and television media platforms.  Nothing more.  Such use is not entitled to the 
heightened First Amendment protection afforded by the Rogers artistic relevance 
test.  The district court erred as a matter of law when it applied this test, and its 
order granting summary judgment should be reversed. 
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B. The Rogers Artistic Relevance Test Does Not Preclude Plaintiff’s Claims  
Even if this Court expands application of the Rogers artistic relevance test to 
such commercial uses of a non-culturally significant mark, the district court erred 
in granting summary judgment.   The Rogers test states that in certain artistic 
contexts, the balance between First Amendment interests and the public’s interest 
in avoiding confusion will normally not support application of the Lanham Act 
unless: (1) the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or 
(2) if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the 
source or the content of the work.  Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. 
Here, P&G used the WEBCELEB mark as a sponsored category label in 
connection with its People’s Choice Awards Favorite Web Celeb.  ER50-51. 
Defendants Microsoft and BermanBraun used the mark in a stylized form under a 
magnifying glass in the same way as Defendants’ flagship WONDERWALL 
trademark, and in close connection with that mark as seen in the examples below, 
taken directly from the WonderWall website: 
                                             
The stylized version of the WEBCELEB mark on the right, was used in a position 
and manner consistent with Microsoft and BermanBraun’s other marks such as the 
WONDERWALL mark shown on the left.  Id.  
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 While it did serve an identifying function in both uses, the WEBCELEB 
mark as used by Defendants had no “artistic relevance” to the underlying work.  In 
considering this, it is important to recognize that the word “artistic” modifies the 
word “relevance.”  Relevance alone is not sufficient to bring a use within the first 
prong of the Rogers test.  The concept of “artistic relevance” is best understood by 
reference to the cases in which this test was developed.   
 For example, in Rogers the title “Ginger and Fred” had artistic relevance to 
the underlying work about dancers emulating Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire.  
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996-97.   In MCA Records the title “Barbie Girl” had artistic 
relevance to the underlying work, a social commentary about Mattel’s iconic doll 
and its place in cultural values.  MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 899.  See also Cliffs 
Notes v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub. Group, 886 F.2d 490, 491 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(publication allegedly parodying plaintiff's publication named Cliff Notes); Twin 
Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Pubs. Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1370 (2d Cir. 1992) (book 
title referring to plaintiff's television series named Twin Peaks);  ETW Corp. v. 
Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918-19 (6th Cir. 2003) (painting referring to 
plaintiff Tiger Woods); Walking Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d at 796 (photographer 
referring to plaintiff's famous Barbie doll); E.S.S. Entertainment, 547 F.3d at 1097 
(video game maker allegedly referring to plaintiff's strip club).   
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 In this case, Microsoft and BermanBraun have consistently emphasized the 
purely utilitarian function of their use of WEBCELEB, and make no effort to 
attribute any artistic relevance to the underlying web pages bearing gossip about 
Ashton Kutcher or Kim Kardashian.  Unlike other cases applying the Rogers test, 
Defendants’ use of the mark does not make artistic reference to Plaintiff 
Webceleb’s product.  In fact, Defendants consistently assert that their use of 
WEBCELEB was purely descriptive, “simply describing the content of the page” 
and “tersely and accurately describes the contents of the Award.”  Thus, 
Defendants’ – particularly Microsoft and BermanBraun which used the 
WEBCELEB mark to brand the celebrity pages of their gossip website – cannot 
attribute any artistic relevance to their use of WEBCELEB.   
 The evidence available to date further indicates that Defendants’ use of the 
WEBCELEB mark was explicitly misleading.  Defendants’ commercial use of the 
mark confused consumers and drove huge volumes of traffic looking for P&G’s 
Web Celeb category to Plaintiff’s indie music website.  ER45-46.  Thus, the 
limited evidence developed to date indicates that even if the Rogers test applied 
here, Defendants’ commercial use of the WEBCELEB mark does not come within 
the protections of the First Amendment.   
Finally, application of the Rogers test implicates several genuine issues of 
material fact that are clearly the subject of dispute.  The issues of whether 
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defendants’ were engaged in a commercial or non-commercial use of the 
WEBCELEB mark, whether their use of the mark had artistic relevance to the 
underlying work, and whether or not Defendants’ use was explicitly misleading are 
all factual issues that preclude granting summary judgment.  See Parks v. La Face 
Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003) (denying summary judgment under Rogers 
test due to genuine issue of material fact regarding artistic relevance of use of 
plaintiff’s name in the title of a song); see also Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 
1073, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (denying motion to dismiss, but noting factual issues 
regarding whether or not the accused political advertisement was an artistic work 
subject to the artistic relevance test).  Thus, even if this Court expands the 
application of the Rogers test to cases such as this, the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants. 
C. Webceleb Is Entitled to Further Discovery Pursuant to Rule 56(d) 
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (formerly Rule 56(f)) provides that if a nonmovant 
shows shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot 
present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering 
the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take 
discovery; or (3)  issue any other appropriate order.  “The burden is on the party 
seeking additional discovery to proffer sufficient facts to show that the evidence 
sought exists, and that it would prevent summary judgment.”  Chance v. Pac-Tel 
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Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d 1151, 1161 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Nidds v. Schindler 
Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 1996)).  To meet this burden, the party 
opposing summary judgment must file an affidavit specifying: (1) the specific facts 
that party hopes to elicit from further discovery; (2) the facts sought exist; and (3) 
the sought-after facts are essential to opposing summary judgment.  Family Home 
and Finance Center, Inc. v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 525 F.3d 822, 
827 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Tatum v. San Francisco, 441 F.3d 
1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006).  
When a summary judgment motion is filed “before a party has had a realistic 
opportunity to pursue discovery related to the theory of the case, district courts 
should grant any 56(f) motion fairly freely.”  Burlington Northern Santa Fe R.R. 
Co. v. Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation, 323 F.3d 767, 
773-774 (9th Cir. 2003).  Continuance of a motion for summary judgment for the 
purposes of discovery should be granted almost as a matter of course unless the 
non-moving party has not diligently pursued discovery of the evidence.  Id. 
(citations omitted).   “Summary denial is especially inappropriate where the 
material sought is also the subject of outstanding discovery requests.”  VISA Int'l 
Serv. Ass'n v. Bankcard Holders of Am., 784 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986).   
This Court reviews the district court's decision on a Rule 56(d) motion under the 
“abuse of discretion” standard.  Id. at 773.   
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The district court brushed aside Webceleb’s Rule 56(d) request to defer or 
deny Defendants motion for summary judgment to allow for discovery, stating in a 
footnote that Webceleb’s counsel did not state that any of the materials sought in 
discovery were “essential to his opposition.”  ER14.  “Absent such a showing, the 
Court declines to deny or defer ruling on the motion.”  Id.  In fact, Webceleb’s 
counsel clearly and consistently indicated that further discovery was necessary 
with respect to specific genuine issues of material fact in dispute in the case, 
including: 
• Defendants’ use of WEBCELEB as a trademark (key documents showing 
trademark use that were offered in support of Webceleb’s opposition brief 
were received from Defendants just four days prior); 
• Defendants’ decision to use the WEBCELEB mark; 
• Any due diligence performed by Defendants to clear the mark before use; 
• Commercial aspects of Defendants’ use of the mark including advertising 
revenues and other commercial benefits derived from their use of the mark; 
• Evidence relating to actual or potential consumer confusion relating to 
Defendants’ use of the mark; 
• All of Defendants’ uses of the mark across all media, including without 
limitation “Web Celeb Ambush” videos which are believed to exist but have 
not been produced; 
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• When Defendants became aware of Plaintiff and their reaction to that 
awareness; 
• Defendants decision to stop using the WEBCELEB mark in response to 
Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction; and 
• Likelihood of consumer confusion and the various factual issues relevant to 
the Sleekcraft inquiry. 
ER16-20.  Among these, several reflect genuine issues of material fact specifically 
relevant to application of the Rogers artistic relevance test.  For example, evidence 
of actual or potential confusion goes directly to the “explicitly misleading” prong 
of the Rogers test.  Evidence regarding all uses of the WEBCELEB mark is 
essential so that all of Defendants’ uses can be evaluated in the correct context 
under the Rogers test.  Evidence regarding commercial aspects of Defendants’ use 
of the mark goes to the “artistic relevance” prong of the Rogers test.  Ultimately, as 
its counsel indicated in his declaration, this discovery was essential to Webceleb’s 
ability to oppose Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.    
Moreover, Plaintiff diligently sought discovery from Defendants on all 
topics relevant to this case.  Discovery, however, was not a smooth process.  
ER16-18.  P&G resisted discovery, requiring Plaintiffs to seek the assistance of the 
court via a motion to compel, and as of the date Webceleb filed its opposition brief 
Microsoft had produced just sixty-eight (68) pages of documents.  ER17-18.  In 
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response to Webceleb’s motion to compel, P&G had just recently produced 
substantial additional materials, and Webceleb anticipated setting depositions of all 
key witnesses promptly once it had sufficient document production from 
Defendants.  Id. 
The pleadings closed in this case on March 29, 2012.  Defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment was filed on June 12, 2012, less than a month after a 
schedule had been set in the case and five and a half months before the close of 
discovery.   Webceleb diligently sought discovery relevant to genuine issues of 
material fact in dispute and necessary to its opposition to Defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment.  The district court’s summary refusal to grant even a brief 
continuance to allow such discovery was an abuse of discretion warranting reversal 
and remand for further proceedings. 
I.1. D. Defendants Use of WEBCELEB Was Commercial Speech.  
While it erred in granting summary judgment based on the Rogers test, the 
district court properly denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the 
grounds that its use of the WEBCELEB mark was not commercial speech.  While 
this issue is not the subject of a cross-appeal, it will be briefly addressed here as it 
may be pressed by Defendants as an alternate basis for affirmance. 
For purposes of the Lanham Act, noncommercial speech is speech not used 
“in connection with a sale of goods or services.”  Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 
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403 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2005), quoting Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Seattle Lighting 
Fixture Co., 345 F.3d 1140, 1143 (9th Cir. 2003).  While commercial speech does 
receive some First Amendment protection, the Lanham Act customarily avoids 
violating the First Amendment by operating only when consumers are likely to be 
misled or confused by the alleged infringer's use.  See, Central Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)(noting that 
there is no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial speech that 
does not accurately inform the public about lawful activity); see also 6 J. Thomas 
McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 31:142, at 31-229 
(4th ed. 1996 & Supp. 2008) (describing low level of First Amendment protection 
for misleading speech); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
960, 973 (1993) (noting that so long as trademark law “limits itself to its traditional 
role of avoiding confusion in the marketplace, there's little likelihood that free 
expression will be hindered”). 
Here, Defendants’ use of the WEBCELEB mark was commercial.  
WonderWall is a commercial, for profit, celebrity gossip website.  The available 
evidence confirms that WonderWall generates revenues through the sale of 
advertising throughout its website.  WonderWall uses its content – celebrity gossip 
and images – to generate visits to its website and sells advertising on its various 
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web pages on that website based on the number of “impressions” it gets for the 
advertisement.   ER50-53. 
WonderWall used the WEBCELEB mark to brand particular content that it 
displayed on its website – photos and information about PCA Web Celeb nominees 
– and sold advertising space on those pages.  P&G’s PCA website similarly 
provides advertising for P&G’s own products as well as for various other 
commercial businesses like WonderWall that sponsor the show.  Id.  P&G 
similarly used the WEBCELEB brand to generate valuable page views on its 
website and exploited those page views for their advertising value.  Id. 
Use of a mark “in connection with” the sale of goods or services does not 
require that the term itself be used to sell something.  See, e.g., PETA, 263 F.3d at 
365.  Where a web site presents commercial advertisements it is a commercial use.  
For example, in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 
F.3d 359, (4th Cir. 2001) (“PETA”), the defendant operated a website at 
www.peta.org purportedly on behalf of “People Eating Tasty Animals” and 
asserted that the site was a parody of the plaintiff’s website.  The Court of Appeals 
confirmed that this was a commercial use because, even though the defendants’ 
website did not sell anything, it provided likes to “commercial operations offering 
goods and services.”  Thus, Defendants’ use of the mark was “in connection with” 
the sale of goods and services and was a commercial use. 
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 As the district court properly held, the commercial use of the WEBCELEB 
mark by Defendants to generate advertising revenues and other commercial 
benefits at least raises an issue of fact. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 For all of the foregoing reasons, Webceleb respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the order of the district court, vacate the judgment entered by the 
district court, and remand the case to the district case for further discovery. 
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